The Sixth Circuit case on which Finch so heavily relies to argue otherwise, Garza v. 1997) (per curiam) (“A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense.” (citation omitted)). Statutes of limitations are affirmative defenses. Despite his efforts, the two defenses are distinct. Finch attempts to paint Casey’s statute-of-limitations defense as a time-barred authorship counterclaim-limited by the same three-year statute of limitations that hinders Finch here. To be clear, Finch doesn’t challenge the statute of limitations’ application rather, he challenges the availability of the defense. Notwithstanding the district court’s straightforward ruling, Finch raises one narrow issue on appeal: whether Casey could raise the statute of limitations as a defense at all. 2 USCA11 Case: 23-10554 4 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: Opinion of the Court Page: 4 of 5 23-10554 run on Finch’s § 203 claim when Casey expressly repudiated Finch’s authorship in May 2015. 1 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Salinero v. The relevant events begin with the 2015 letter. The parties dispute whether Casey ever received the letter, but that doesn’t matter for purposes of this appeal. Accordingly, the district court held, the clock began to Finch allegedly also sent a termination letter to Casey in 2012. An express assertion of sole authorship or ownership-like Casey’s letter-triggers the accrual of an ownership claim. 2 Copyrightbased claims that turn on ownership or authorship accrue on the date that the “plaintiff learns, or should as a reasonable person have learned, that the defendant was violating his ownership rights.” See, e.g., Webster v. The district court granted summary judgment for Casey on the ground that Finch’s claims were time-barred. § 507(b) (copyright claims must be “commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”). Casey asserted multiple defenses in response, including that Finch’s claim was barred by the copyright law’s three-year statute of limitations. This litigation began in 2022, when Finch filed suit against Casey and others requesting declaratory judgment that his § 203 termination rights were valid. 1 Four years later, in 2019, Finch sent Casey a notice of termination under § 203. § 203, and thus didn’t USCA11 Case: 23-10554 23-10554 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: Opinion of the Court Page: 3 of 5 3 retain any termination rights. In 2015, Casey sent Finch a letter asserting that Finch was never an “author” under the terms of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Some legal back-andforth occurred in the interim, but we’ll jump ahead. In 1983, Richard Finch transferred his copyright and royalty rights to bandmate Harry Casey. PER CURIAM: There’s a lot of history in this case, but only a small part of it matters. 1:22-cv-20144-DPG _ Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. EMI Longitude Music, Defendant, HARRY WAYNE CASEY, an individual, HARRICK MUSIC, INC., USCA11 Case: 23-10554 Document: 27-1 2 Date Filed: Opinion of the Court Page: 2 of 5 23-10554 a Florida corporation, Defendants-Appellees, MATTHEW NELLES, et al., Respondents. FINCH, versus Plainti -Appellant, EMI CONSORTIUM SONGS, INC., a New York corporation, d.b.a. 23-10554 Non-Argument Calendar _ RICHARD R. USCA11 Case: 23-10554 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: In the Page: 1 of 5 United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit _ No.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |